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Mallika Shakya

University of Oxford

Capitalism and Ethnicity facing a Rising Wave
of Communism in Nepal

The difference of vocations among various cultural groups and its implications for economic
differentials have grave imprints on political and social movements, yet these have been largely
ignored by economists, anthropologists and political scientists. While their strategic social
positioning is evident, entrepreneurial and business groups have been especially elusive groups for
ethnographers to access. On the one hand, business elites are the biggest beneficiaries of economic
and social change; and on the other hand, they are known for their cold adherence to monetary
calculations, which makes them one of the biggest obstacles when it comes to ushering in any
form of social change. Although the pragmatic forces defining this class group speaks for the way
they tend to willingly cooperate with political regimes of any credentials and ideologies that hold
power, their engagements with the state are not always culture-neutral. A brief account of Nepal’s
business history shows that there have been deep cultural overtones to the way entrepreneurs
are treated by the state. This paper reconstructs Nepal’s modern history spanning half a century
to highlight how business elites from certain caste and ethnic groups have flourished in Nepal
during the rules of the caste-based muluki ain and monarchy-based panchayat. It examines the
nature of multi-party democracy which claimed to adopt an ethnically neutral polity but did little
about the already existing ethnic marginalization and discontent. It then examines the way in
which the rise of the Maoists added a new dimension to the continuity of the rules of the game.
While the Maoists seem to take some credit for finally unpacking the old baggage of caste and
ethnicity in the way Nepali state politics is run, it has to be said that the nature of the struggle
has been implicit within Nepali history long before they came to dominate Nepali politics.

Introduction
In her discussion of the rise of new corporatism
in India, Barbara Harriss-White (2005) argued that
market forces alone are inadequate to guarantee
livelihood and life; hence it draws on non-market
forms of exchange such as reciprocity, redistribution
and patronage to sustain itself. Such forms of
exchange may be embedded in the broader social,
cultural and political trajectories followed by the
state and civil society institutions that get reworked
to be instruments of business regulation. I present
a complementary case on Nepal following this
framework. Ethnic factors have regulated the Nepali
economy and resisted state influence for the past
several centuries. The study of the embeddedness of
ethnically based factors into business organization
can inform studies of contemporary politics and
society in Nepal. Yet there is little conversation among

the disciplines of economics, sociology and political
science about Nepal that explores capitalism’s
link with the broader social and political order.
How has the current political transition affected
modern business organization in Nepal, and is it
materially different from the past? Does the natural
pragmatism that characterizes businessmen
preclude their being proselytized into ethnicitycharged politics? More importantly, to what extent
is ethnicity a new variable that has come to dominate
Nepali politics and to what extent is it a new
manifestation of an old phenomenon? These will
be the key questions this article will try to address
in its two parts. The first part of the article is a
historiography of entrepreneurship-related policies
and practices; the second, an ethnography of the
modern entrepreneurship-related organizations
that dominate contemporary policy-making. The
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paper begins however with a discussion of the conceptual
frameworks examining this complex problem.

Culture, politics and business
pragmatism: A conceptual framework
Far from being remote from political processes, or
rooted solely in the linear modeling of classical economics,
the nesting of individual actions of businessmen and others
within the broader norms of social class and politics were
argued famously by North (1990) and Bourdieu (1984). They
take ‘habitus’ or ‘institutions’ as their starting point which
consists of a whole range of values, ethical orientation and
preferences that take shape through an individual’s early
life experiences involving socialization in family, peer and
social groups. It is further argued that broader organizations
– business, political and social – evolve from the collective
culture of people through a process that is negotiated, revised
and reinstated time and again giving the society a certain
distinction.
The idea of social distinction is pursued further in
the empirical work of Clegg et al (1990) who argue that
capitalisms have taken distinct shapes across societies,
countries and regions. A particular case they discuss is that of
the two contrasting models of capitalism that have developed
in the East and the West owing to broader political and social
systems surrounding the immediate ways of doing business
in enterprises. It was argued that the enmeshing that takes
place between the strategies of businessmen, the vision of
politicians and the realities of the social and legal orders gives
rise to the overall institutional framework for the organiaation
of economic action, which may lie somewhere in the range
between the authoritarian democratic type (as in East Asia)
and the liberal democratic type (as in Europe, the United
States and Australia).
Within society-economy embeddedness, Whitley (1999)
has conceptualized a new framework, a ‘comparativebusiness-systems approach’ (CBS) to anatomize business
organizations and their interconnectedness with political,
labor and cultural systems. The core of the CBS approach is
the comparison of business systems across societies on the
three important fronts of capital generation, employment
structure and business alliance-building. Whitley then places
business systems into the broader institutional structuring
which includes state-entrepreneur relationships, business
associations and labor unions. His account of the capitalisms
of Korea, Taiwan and Japan highlights the extent to which
contemporary capitalisms in these countries, as distinct from
each other as they may be, draw on similar social institutions
of individual and collective loyalties as much as on their
political histories of war and the bureaucratic arrangements
for power sharing between the state and industrial groups.
Harriss-White (2005) connects the discussion of societyenterprise embeddedness with civil society discourse. Her
framework of the social structure of accumulation (SSA)
further focuses on the role of civil society institutions – in
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the case of India she focuses wholly on caste – in capitalistic
transformations. Civil society, in the Gramscian view, consists
of economic and social movements which may work to develop
a counter-narrative that may eventually undermine bourgeois
hegemony that usually evolves from interest groups protected
by an undemocratic or semi-democratic state. In the case of
India of the twenty-first century, where the parameters of
accumulation are changing fast, dominant social institutions
like caste are being reworked rapidly into a corporatist order or
collective organization of economic interests. Harriss-White
argues that caste has provided an ‘ideological backcloth’
or a whole institutional structure on which the corporatist
project can function. Modern institutions such as business
associations, labor unions and even political parties follow
capitalistic norms but are shaped in their actions by primordial
caste hierarchies. Her ethnographic account of a small South
Indian town, Arni, shows how caste continues to supply the
broader entrepreneurial order necessary for corporatism in
modern India, which is entrusted either to the state or the
pure capitalist forces in other countries. This assertion holds
true for Nepal with regards to its ethnic order.
All three approaches share the idea that economic actions
are embedded in the norms and networks of the social order.
They point out the inadequacies of neoclassical economics
and question the claims of political theorists that state politics
arise from the power of guns, votes and street protests alone.
They make the case that modern orders are continuously
negotiated on factory shopfloors, boardrooms and through
class connections. Old cultural histories construct the
narrative necessary for positioning of various social groups
(caste or ethnic) for negotiations; ongoing political and
economic developments both revise and reproduce histories;
and eventually old institutions are reshaped by the forces
of modernity and pragmatism. Collectively, the three
strands of this literature indicate some opportunities for
greater crossover between the boundaries of the disciplines
of economics, sociology and politics. This indeed will be
the aim of the following section which provides a historical
account that may explain how today’s ethnic order in Nepal
is the work of the past.

Cultural politics and markets
Based both on secondary historical sources and by
my ethnography of businessmen, I reconstruct below a
comprehensive history of the Nepali politico-economy. My
aim is to counter the popular claim that the Maoists brought
ethnicity into Nepali politics (Bhattarai, 1998), and to propose
that ethnicity is not a new element in the way Nepali state and
society has functioned over the past five centuries. It will
be fair to say however that Maoist politics which gave rise to
the politicization of the ethnic movements have added new
dimensions to state-society relations.

From Medieval Times to the Rana regime
Caste and ethnicity have been central to both industrial

and foreign policy making in Nepal. Medieval Nepal’s
comparative business advantages lay solely in trade with
Tibet in which the Buddhist Newars established a monopoly
for a long time. The lowest two of the dozen passes that
went into Tibet from the southern plains – Kuti and Kyirong
– passed via the Kathmandu Valley while marriage of the
Nepali princess Bhrikuti with the legendary Tibetan king
Srong Btsan Sgam Po opened the way for Nepali acculturation
of Tibet along the lines of Buddhist spiritual and material
arts. Although the Nepal-Tibet trade was regulated by the
treaties sealed by Newar rulers dating back as early as 1650,
the Shah and Rana rulers could never penetrate the lucrative
Nepal-Tibet trade even after they defeated the Newars in war.
Three violent wars between Nepal and Tibet mark the
transition as the Shah dynasty took charge of Nepali foreign
affairs. The first war of 1786 was waged to settle disputes over
the purity of Tibetan coins minted in Nepal. The second war
of 1791 stemmed from disputes arising from the fact that
Nepal had given protection to Syamarpa Lama, a high profile
Tibetan political refugee. A third war was fought in 1855
in the aftermath of Tibet’s (and China’s) refusal to support
Nepal in its resistance to an assault from the British East
India Company in the south. Tibet’s response to Nepal’s plea
for help clearly showed that it retained a grudge against the
Shahs for displacing the Newar rulers from the Kathmandu
Valley.
Although the Buddhist Newars remained the ethnic group
that dominated trade with Tibet, they were increasingly
regulated by the Shah regime, as seen in the new taxes and
order of ritual purification imposed on them. It should also
be noted that the Ranas ruled under a strictly caste/ethnicitybased common law (muluki ain) which took its roots from
the ancient Hindu doctrine Manusmriti.1 This law forbade
non-trader castes to engage in entrepreneurial activities.
Eventually, Nepal’s comparative advantage over the
Tibet trade began to dwindle in the late nineteenth century.
Geographically, the British opened a new route via Sikkim
in 1877 and subsequently linked it with a railroad between
Darjeeling and Kolkata in 1881. Politically, Sir Francis
Younghusband’s Tibet expedition of 1904 – ironically assisted
by the contemporary Rana regime of Nepal – imposed a new
treaty on Tibet to end Nepal’s legal monopoly over Tibet’s
foreign trade and initiated direct trade links with the East
India Company via Darjeeling (Acharya, 1999: 233 and
Whelpton, 2005: 77). Further, after the Chinese invaded
Tibet in 1950 and closed the border with Nepal in 1959,
the Nepal-Tibet trade came to a standstill (Rankin, 2004).
With it came the demise of the glory of the Buddhist Newar
1. In fact, upon his return from a legendary tour to the United
Kingdom, the first Rana prime minister Jung Bahadur Rana had it codified
in 1854 in his attempt to give Nepal its magna carta or the first codified
legal document. It should be clarified however that this was never meant
to be a document about protection of the rights of the people as the magna
carta was.
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traders.
By the mid-1880s, British India was exerting an
overwhelming influence on Nepal and under its blessing,
the Ranas emerged as formidable rulers powerful enough to
dictate to the legitimate Shah monarchs and intermarry into
their families. In return for their military support in quelling
the first Indian Sepoy uprising in 1857, the British returned
Nepal four bordering districts in the far west, Banke, Bardia,
Kailali and Kanchanpur which later came to be known as
the naya muluk (new territories). There was a great deal of
ambiguity as to whether this land was given as personal gifts
or birta to the Ranas or returned to the state of Nepal (Regmi,
1999). There was equally a great deal of ambiguity as to
whether the Shahs or the Ranas were the real kings of Nepal.
Amidst such vagueness, the Ranas launched an ambitious
project that established the first tier of modern manufacturing
in Nepal, which decisively favored Indian businessmen over
indigenous Newar businessmen in developing trade and
industrial links with British India.
Still under the overwhelming Indian (British) influence,
the Ranas issued pragyapan patra (state letter) to invite
Marwari businessmen from North India to establish various
commercial manufacturing and processing plants as well
as to develop distribution of networks in Nepal for Indian
consumer goods.2 The first modern industry in Nepal – a jute
mill – was established in 1936 by Radha Kissen Chamaria,
a Kolkata businessman, in joint partnership with Juddha
Shamsher Rana, Prime Minister at the time. In 1942 two
paper mills were established in joint partnership with the
Ranas and the Marwaris (Gaige, 1975). Processing plants for
matches, cigarettes, rice and vegetable oil were established in
the same area soon afterwards, mostly to fill in the shortages
caused by World War II, and were again jointly owned by
the Marwaris and the Ranas. The Marwaris remained in
Nepal as a minority group, comprising a mere 0.2 per cent
of Nepal’s population (Whelpton, 2005: 9), but importantly,
because of the proximity to the infrastructure developed in
the Tarai after deforestation removed the natural border of
the charkose jhadi forests, the overall access to the so-called
‘open-border’ between Nepal and India remained in the
hands of the Marwaris along with other local residents of the
Tarai, i.e., the Madhesis.

The Panchayati era: State protection of business and
politics
The Rana regime was overthrown in 1951 by a popular
2. The Ranas were not the first to develop caste-based decrees for
economic vocations. Similar caste-based formal policies have been seen
in Nepal as early as the seventeenth century. Siddhi Narsingha Malla had
invited a priest clan from South India to serve as the designated priests
in Pashupatinath temple. The arrival of the Rajkarnikars as confetionary
producers and Rjopadhyayas and Kayasthas as Hindu priests further
supported caste-based policies prevalent in medieval Nepal.
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uprising led by King Tribhuvan and an alliance of democratic
political parties. This change of regime initially gave Nepal
a new democratic constitution and a new civil code that
eventually replaced the caste/ethnicity-based common law
(muluki ain). However, this movement did nothing to change
the fact that all political powers remained in the grip of the
Bahun-Chhetri rulers. Although the Ranas had reacted to
the popular movement by brutally suppressing it at all levels,
the muluki ain had been so powerful an institution that they
could not do away with caste-based treatment even when
responding to such serious charges as treason. For example,
when the existence of the first Nepali political party Praja
Parishad was discovered by the regime and all its leaders
captured, , four were either publicly hanged or shot to death,
but Tanka Prasad Acharya, a Bahun, had to be spared. The
common law had categorically defined bramha-hatya, a
murder of a Bahun, to be a sin more heinous than even a
proven case of treason. As James Fisher (1997) has argued
in his seminal book Living Martyrs, the principles of caste/
ethnicity-based purity and pollution widely dictated the
contemporary common law that prevailed under the Rana
regime. Not surprisingly, the first generation of political
leaders who survived the brutal oppression of the Rana
regime was almost exclusively Bahuns, a legacy that continues
to haunt Nepal after half a century.
In the national election that followed the promulgation
of the new constitution, the Bahun-Chhetris who were
numerically a minority were overwhelmingly represented
in the new parliament, while the indigenous nationalities
and low caste people were grossly underrepresented. This
paved the way for the passage of the controversial economic
and governance policies that established the Bahuns as the
primary beneficiaries of economic protection by the state.
A good example is the controversial Civil Service Act of
1956, which was widely criticized by the representatives of
the Janajatis for being pro-Hindu and pro-Sanskrit (Seddon,
2001: 87-91). On entrepreneurship, the Business Companies
Act of 1951 was of key importance. In theory, it encouraged
all castes and ethnicities to engage in business enterprises,
but in practice failed to correct unequal distribution of wealth
among cultural groups. As a result, no longer forbidden from
seeking profit-making ventures, the Bahun-Chhetri elites
quickly tapped into the business opportunities opened up by
the new policy. The marginalized ethnic groups with little
wealth of their own had no means to generate capital to set
up in business.
Over ninety new private joint stock companies were
registered between 1951 and 1964 under the Company Act
of 1951, and over 70 per cent of the ownership lay in the
hands of the Bahun-Chhetris and the Marwaris (Zivetz,
1992). It is true that several Newars, Thakalis and Lamas also
commenced their business ventures during this period, but
the Bahun-Chhetris emerged as the group that gained the
most by Nepal’s economic modernization.
The 1970s and 1980s saw a rapid increase in state
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discretion with regard to business enterprises. The first three
National Economic Plans – of 1956, 1962 and 1965 – explicitly
declared state protection for cottage and small industries, and
implicitly sought to protect all other industries from foreign
competition. The Industrial Act of 1974, on the one hand,
standardized the definitions and procedures in various
business laws and controlled enterprise proliferation through
quotas and licenses; on the other, it dished out generous
state subsidies to entrepreneurs in the forms of banking and
tax concessions. For example, selected village and cottate
industries were given five year tax holiday. The Industrial Act
of 1981 announced an even more generous, non-discretionary
six-year tax holiday for all cottage industries. This was to
be followed by a series of yet other subsidies and incentives,
including a discretionary tax exemption for industries
producing or distributing essential goods and infrastructure.
A Nine-Point Export Promotion Program was introduced in
1984 that allowed exporters access to concessional credit;
the Nepal Industrial Development Corporation (NIDC), a
government-controlled capital investment entity was directed
to compulsorily allocate ten per cent of its investment in
export industries. The nature of the state protection of various
industrial sectors however did little to correct the caste and
ethnic biases that had influenced state allocation of resources
for centuries; if anything, it exacerbated this by letting the
subsidies be captured by the Bahun-Chhetri elites within the
status quo.
Although this was not the intention of economic
restructuring, poor attention to ethnic implications led to a
situation where the best protected industries went into the
hands of the ruling elites and their allies while marginalized
caste and ethnic groups proliferated in the least protected
industries. For example, the trans-Himalayan trade, which
was once a grand cultural trade, had by then shrunk into an
insignificant bartering of salt and other basic necessities, and
was now dominated by rural Newars and Sherpas. In contrast,
the National Salt Trading Corporation, a modern lucrative
parastatal that had gained the monopoly over distribution of
essential commodities throughout the nation was dominated
by the Marwaris and the Bahun-Chhetris (Zivetz, 1992: 67).
In manufacturing, only 60 garment factories were deemed
eligible to export in 1984. They then collected rent from over
1,000 unregistered factories called ‘fabricators’ who would do
all the work but had no access to export channels. Most of
these registered factories were owned by Bahun-Chhetris or
Marwaris (Shakya, 2004). The situation changed as soon as
the government liberalized international trade and domestic
firm registration (see below).

Democratization and economic liberalization
The People’s Movement of 1990, which overthrew the
pro-monarchy Panchayat system, has to be understood at
different levels. At one level, it was the street protests that
forced King Birendra to legalize political parties, curtail his
own powers and allow a new constitution. At another level, it

was the King’s 1989 arms deal with China that had angered
India so much that it responded by sealing the Nepal-India
border until Nepal virtually ran out of daily necessities
such as petrol, oil and sugar for three months. In any case,
the new Nepali constitution defined Nepal as a ‘multiethnic, multi-lingual, democratic, independent, indivisible,
sovereign, Hindu and Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom’3
Indigenous nationalities and minority religious activists
were very disappointed that the word Hindu still remained;
nonetheless, the addition of the word ‘multi-ethnic’ was a
genuinely new departure.
Soon after, in 1992, the new government issued a new
Industrial Act which spelled out a radical program embracing
economic liberalization. Although Nepal had signed two
important policy lending contracts with the World Bank
and the IMF in 1986 and 1989 agreeing to deregulate the
domestic market and international trade, it was not until the
change in political regime that it truly implemented them.
Like elsewhere, Nepalis equated multi-party democracy
with market-based capitalism, evidenced in that even the
most conservative of the socialists and communists could
not dissociate the two. The Communist Party of Nepal
(United Marxist-Leninist) dropped its Maoist ideal in 1989,
and participated in the movement for the restoration of
democracy, thereafter which it consolidated its approval of
competitive democracy and free-market capitalism in its
People’s Multiparty Democracy resolution in 1993. It has
also to be noted that the finance minister of the interim
cabinet of 1990 that chartered the first outline of economic
liberalization in Nepal was a well-known socialist, Devendra
Raj Panday.
On the ethnic front, the 1990 movement gave rise to
an ‘ethnogenesis’ similar to what happened in India during
the time of independence, and for rather similar reasons
(Whelpton, 2005; Gellner, 2003). The formerly marginalized
castes and ethnic groups felt that they had been liberated by
the demise of the Panchayat ideology that had claimed that
all Nepalis were the same, while in practice institutionalizing
high caste Bahun-Chhetri supremacy. Symbolic changes
were made by the Nepali state in media and communication,
including broadcasting in regional languages and revising
the definition of the Nepali national costume. However, the
new constitution gave little room for much expected ethnic
liberation, and Nepal officially remained a Hindu kingdom.
Much has been written about how the newly granted rights to
freely organize gave a new impetus to already existing ethnic
associations of several indigenous nationalities (Hangen,
2007).
A series of important legal and policy measures followed
the liberal industrial policy of 1992. Most of the public
subsidies were discontinued and entry/exit barriers in the
forms of lengthy bureaucratic procedures and licensing
restrictions were removed so that access to entrepreneurial
3. Nepali Constitution 1991: 4 (1).
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opportunities was no longer confined to selected population
groups.
Tariff and non-tariff barriers were reduced
significantly, making Nepal the first South Asian country
to have trade policies comparable to East Asia in the early
1990s (Acharya et al, 1998). Further, the Foreign Investment
and Technology Transfer Act of 1996 not only allowed one
hundred per cent foreign investments in business ventures
without having to find a Nepali business partner, but also
eased controls on capital repatriation. Further, an Industrial
Promotion Board was set up in 1997 to ensure effective
monitoring of the implementation of the policies that were
adopted. A series of business membership organizations
evolved in time to facilitate further dialogue between the
public and private sectors on issues affecting business
operations. These directly attacked the interests of the state
protected business elites who were now forced to compete
both with domestic and foreign rivals, and on both fronts in
local and global markets.
Economic liberalization was never going to be the
panacea. The caste- and ethnicity-based grievances relating
to both business and politics were not fully addressed by
either democracy or liberalization. One of the reasons some
business houses remained more privileged than others within
the so-called market-based competitive capitalism is the way
issues of caste and ethnicity remain indispensable to the
way societies and bureaucracies function in Nepal. In Nepal,
capitalism and democracy are practiced by businessmen,
politicians and bureaucrats through caste- and ethnicitybased cognition, networks and orders. Among 33 business
partnerships within the garment manufacturing industry
that I surveyed in 2002, I found only one factory that was
a business partnership between indigenous nationalities
and a Bahun-Chhetri/Indian. All others were business
partnerships among two or more groups of Bahun-Chhetris,
Marwaris, Madheshis and Indian nationals. When asked
why businessmen do not build partnerships with people
of other cultural groups, several businessmen emphasized
the importance of culture-derived trust while operating in
a business environment characterized by extremely weak
legal measures on protection of intellectual property rights
and other property rights, as well as protection against sheer
fraudulent transactions (Shakya, 2007).
At any rate, it will be fair to say that Nepal’s new
economic policies at best aim to ‘tolerate’ the marginalized
cultural groups and call for harmony among caste and
ethnic groups than proactively ensure that diverse identities
among the population are truly empowered. The state has
turned a blind eye to deeply rooted hierarchy between the
ruling and non-ruling caste/ethnic elites and further on
to the lower castes and marginalized ethnic groups. The
privileged signifier of equal treatment was actually nothing
of the sort – it stimulated unequal responses. In fact,
competitive patronage has had profound implications for
the business enterprises as well as for state politics. Nepali
liberalization and democracy has produced such a political
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outcome because of the operation of the very institutions
which should have been designed to eliminate the influence
of elite discrimination in both business operations and social
representation systems.

Ethnic nuances in new civil society
organizations
As discussed above, modernization and democratization
have not necessarily led to an ethnicity-neutral socioentrepreneurial order in Nepal. Modern organizations
continue to be characterized by the same ethnic divides as
the old ones. This section will focus on the extent to which
ethnicity adds a dimension to the implicit power struggle
intrinsic among the various associations representing
contesting interests within an entrepreneurial order.

Labor unionism
Labor unionism has been a consistent feature of almost
all political grievances in Nepal for a long time. As early
as 1975, the labor cadre of the Nepali Congress party had
led a historic labor ‘slow-down’ at Biratnagar Jute Mills (the
country’s oldest), under the leadership of G.P. Koirala who
later rose to preside over the ruling Nepali Congress and
serve multiple terms as Prime Minister. Various streams of
the moderate and radical communist parties that proliferated
in Nepal have historically also commanded strong support
from factory workers. The tradition of formally registering
as labor unions, however, came much later. Although the
Nepal Factory Workers’ Act 1986 made some provisions for
labor rights, the Panchayat regime effectively maintained a
ban on overall labor unionism to the effect that the first labor
union of Nepal, the General Federation of Nepal Trade Union
(GEFONT), was founded underground in 1989. The labor
wing of the Nepali Congress was consolidated into the Nepal
Trade Union Congress (NTUC) only in 1991. Both these
unions underwent cycles of mergers and splits following the
trends in their base party politics. Although GEFONT divided
into as many as four splinter groups at times, it recombined
after the 1990 democratic movement. Within the NTUC,
however, a splinter group went on to found the Democratic
Confederation of Nepalese Trade Unions (DECONT) in
January 2001 as the so-called chattise (thirty-six) dissident
parliamentarians from within the Nepali Congress, implicitly
led by the former prime minister, K.P. Bhatterai, challenged
G.P. Koirala’s leadership in parliament. On a different front,
the Maoists had also already formed their own All Nepal
Labor Union – Revolutionary (ANLUR) in 1996 (Manandhar,
2001: 62).
A key issue that has gone unnoticed among the scholars
of labor unionism in Nepal is that of the global changes in
business organization that were fast seeping in. Although
the labor union movement significantly strengthened in the
early and mid-1990s, it never really meaningfully claimed a
space in industries with major industrial significance, e.g.,
garment, handicraft and tourism. In some cases it was extreme
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seasonality of production and lack of predictability of business
which meant that owners could only afford informal and
semi-contracted job opportunities. In other cases, workers
were controlled through kin and ethnic networks such that
they put the family and ethnic loyalty before class loyalty. In
any case, businessmen did their best to keep stronger labor
unions at bay in several of the manufacturing industries and
in their place nurture pro-capitalist labor unions.4 Labor
union movement was to face draconian changes with the
arrival of the Maoists (see section 5).

Business associations
Since most of the business associations were remnants
of the pre-democracy protectionist regime when only elites
could register (more lucrative) businesses, they had small
memberships and functioned more like business clubs that
maintained loyalty to the royals and other ruling elites. It
is an irony that little of this actually changed for several
industries even after the democratic movement and economic
liberalization in the early 1990s. One should not infer from this
that the businessmen had no involvement in the democratic
movement. To the contrary, employees, employers and owners
of several large business houses had marched the streets arm
in arm to call for democracy. What was probably true for
several industries was that although the economic regime and
the government regulations had changed significantly, the
state had only weak relations with businesses when it came
to actual business operations. But there were exceptions to
these involving business associations that deal with industrial
sectors that require closer government support and hence
stronger joint action among business members to obtain this.
The three business associations – the garment, carpet and
handicraft associations – which gained great prominence
at various points of time, had worked towards such joint
action in order to solve immediate challenges looming over
their businesses. Their work exemplifies the pragmatism I
have argued to be inherent among businessmen through
which they negotiate complex political and cultural power
constellations within which they function. To make my point,
I will briefly describe the case of the Garment Association of
Nepal (GAN).
GAN was established with less than 30 business members
in 1987 but its membership had grown to over a thousand
by 1995. Before liberalization in 1992, most of the garment
factories functioned as informal businesses selling to the
elite exporters because the access to the American market,
where most of the Nepali garments went, were restricted to
4. In one extreme case, a garment factory in Kathmandu actively
mobilized the local Nepali Congress leader to arbitrate with local residents
on disputes related to land acquisition and utility consumption, as well as
to facilitate matters of local philanthropy. For such services, this factory
not only paid the NC leader regular party ‘donations’ but also recruited
some of the Congress’ political cadres into the factory workforce for a closer
vigilance. (source: fieldwork, 2001-2004)

only few, most of them Bahun-Chhetris and Marwaris. After
economic liberalization, the readymade garment industry
(RMG) was among the few industries that became subject
to draconian reforms largely owing to the pressures of the
international RMG heavyweights such as the United States.
Once business regulations were simplified and made more
transparent, allowing non-elite businessmen to join, GAN
soon emerged as a formidable lobbying force in the mid and
late 1990s. Even then—or maybe especially because of this
—GAN leadership hardly went out of the hands of the ruling
elites. Within the GAN executive committee (of 21 people),
50 per cent were Bahun-Chhetris, 29 per cent Marwaris and
a further 9 per cent were Newars. There was only one nonNewar indigenous nationalities member of the GAN executive
committee. Most of the GAN members noted, without being
prompted, that most of the past and present Presidents of
GAN were either Bahun-Chhetris or Marwaris with just two
exceptions who were Newars. On who would be the most
suitable candidate for GAN presidency, members said that
they must have access to the ‘top level’ of government. “He
can be anything or anyone, but he should have excellent
contacts to ministers and secretaries, and he should be
willing and able to use those contacts for the greater good
of GAN members,” said one GAN member, describing his
criteria for a competent GAN President. Although a majority
of GAN members were Hindus, they did not require that
high caste Bahun-Chhetris should be their leaders, but since
members of those castes happened to be the political elites
and enjoyed greater access to the government, the pragmatic
outcome among the businessmen was that they were elected
as the GAN leaders.
In terms of business representation and effective policy
advocacy, comparisons have been drawn between GAN
and a wider sample of business associations which were
less central to policymaking. Zivetz (1992), for example,
discusses how the Trans-Himalayan Trade Association, once
involved in lucrative Nepal-Tibet trade between the elites
of the two countries but now confined to the meager barter
of salt and other basic commodities between the bordering
Himalayan populations, was dominated by the indigenous
nationalities. In contrast, a lucrative and state-controlled
National Salt Trading Corporation which controlled
distribution channels of goods of daily necessity to the entire
population was dominated by the Bahun-Chhetris and
Marwaris. However, Newars and other caste or ethnic groups
continue to dominate several business associations involved
in production or exchange at a lower scale where market
forces somewhat offset state regulations.5 For these various
reasons, the Federation of Nepali Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (FNCCI) is among few institutions where BahunChhetri dominance is less pronounced.
Cultural dominance is more than reversed in some of
5. Examples my include the Small Traders’ Association, the Retailers’
Association and several others.

55

HIMALAYA XXVIII (1-2) 2008

the more specialized businesses. For example, the carpet
association was one whose leaders had difficulty reaching
the ministers despite contributing to as much as a quarter of
national exports just because they were not Bahun-Chhetris
or Marwaris and did not have close connections with
policymakers. A second business association whose leaders
were not the ruling elite was the Handicraft Association of
Nepal (HAN). Since handicrafts relied on cultural legacies
mostly confined to Newar artisans, over 80 per cent of the
HAN business members were Newars and so were the HAN
executive members. Since they had little access to the key
policymakers, they raised their own funds, or liaised with
donors and buyers directly, and ran their developmental
programs—most of them on skill development and
certification of standards—with little government help.
As the situations change on the ethnic front, the
business associations have emerged as among the first
of civil society organizations which adapted to political
changes pragmatically. In case of the Garment Association
of Nepal (GAN), they chose to involve their fellow business
members and labor rights activists – many of whom came
from indigenous nationalities who had better rapport with
the Maoists than the Bahun-Chhetris and Marwaris -- to
facilitate collective negotiations with the Maoists on behalf
of the entire business association. The business associations
of hotel and restaurant owners have followed the suit. It is
likely that several other business groups earlier seen to be
conservatives and royalists will pragmatically adapt to the
new ethno-politics. I discuss below the broader political
developments within which such pragmatic decisions were
taken by the businessmen.

Arrival of the Maoists: Institutional
changes seep into business
organization
Much has been said about the evolution of the Maoist
movement in Nepal in its initial phase 1996-2000 (Thapa
and Sijapati, 2004; Hutt, 2004), but little has been discussed
about the subsequent phase when the Maoists transformed
from a purely militaristic force gaining momentum in the
rural areas into one that overhauled its ideology and came to
exert a formidable presence in the urban areas. Hachhethu
(2009) has attributed the Maoists’ adoption of the party
proposal “Democracy in the Twenty-first Century,” as put
forth during the negotiations with the government in 2003,
to be its endorsement of multiparty democracy. It has to be
acknowledged however that several preceding events have set
the stage for this proposal, an important one being adoption
of the Prachanda Path during its second national convention
as early as in February 2001.
Especially regarding business associations and labor
unions which I have argued earlier were weak and
vacuous, it can be said that the sudden emergence of the
Maoist movement in Nepal came to fill the vacuum left by
conventional institutions. At least in the new industries,
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the Maoists effectively dismantled the status-quo of capitalfriendly labor unions. The Prachanda Path called on the
Maoist cadres to move their focus from the periphery to
the centre and to build mobilizing fronts among the factory
workers and students. They did this by raising the flags of
patriotism (by voicing an anti-India rhetoric), indigeneity
(by setting the ‘Indian’ Marwaris against the supposedly
indigenous Newars and other Janajatis), and communism
(by setting the so-called ‘feudal’ castes of Bahun-Chhetris
against the lower castes and by imposing radically anticapitalist demands on behalf of the workers). On all three
counts, labor intensive industries like garments and tourism
became the easy victims. On donation-seeking by Maoists
for their political campaigns, Bahun-Chhetri and Marwari
businessmen received especially hostile treatment from the
Maoists while indigenous nationalities were able to negotiate
far more effectively with the Maoist cadres. On labor
unionism, Maoists covertly infiltrated the factory floors of
the Kathmandu Valley, easily weakening the labor bases of
NTUC and GEFONT (Shakya, 2008).
Beyond immediate meso-level organizations like labor
unions and business associations, the Maoists have successfully
cashed in on the post-1990 ethnic upsurge by accumulating
political capital and creating a political framework for the key
ethnic demands: autonomy and federalism. In the new context
of competitive politics since the April 2006 mass uprising
and removal of the monarchy, they have further consolidated
their claim as an ethnic messiah. It is true that this has been
somewhat weakened by the counter movements staged by the
Madhesis and later on some of the hill Janajatis. Nevertheless,
the Maoists have continued to emphasize ethnicization and
regionalization of its internal party structure throughout the
major transformation it is seeking from a militaristic party
organization into a civic one. The Maoists now have caste,
ethnicity and region-based organizations, from district to
central levels, which have come to peripheralize three of
the four sets of organizational structures it had maintained
during the insurgency period.6 Overshadowing the old
radical structures are the evolving network of Janasewa Samiti
(public service committees) which are being developed in
urban areas to perform civic duties including establishment
of public grievance systems on issues related to business,
social justice and development, among others.
Especially regarding the business issues, the Maoists
seem to be working to accommodate their agenda on state
restructuring within which economic agendas are prominent.
Businessmen were indeed the first group Prachanda met after
winning the national elections in 2008, to whom he assured
protection of personal property and a free market regime.
6. The four organizational structures of the Maoists during the
insurgency period included: (i) party organization top down including
headquarters, central committees, regional, area and village committees;
(ii) the nine Jana Sarkars or the parallel governments; (iii) military chain of
command; and (iv) Jan Adalat or the people’s courts. (Hachhethu, 2009: 65).
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Soon after, some of the leading businessmen were nominated
by the Maoists to the constituent assembly to express their
commitment to capitalism. Other major political parties
followed suit. Multinational and bilateral donors were the
second group Prachanda met to assure the protection of
foreign investors. A few months later, however, the new budget
brought forth a two-pillar model of competition and cooperation. Along the lines of the East Asian model of capitalism
where the states have picked and backed winners, the Maoists
implicitly ushered in notions of ‘patriotic capitalism.’ On
the one hand, this notion called for a shift from the state’s
role as a neutral referee to that of a benevolent party with
interests. On the other hand, this notion formally confirmed
the Maoists’ intention to pronounce positive discrimination
for the marginalized population groups and for employmentgenerating activities. On both counts, this reaffirmed their
commitment to caste and ethnicity as relevant factors in
decision making, which they had consistently maintained
throughout the 2000s.
It should be noted that the Madhesi countermovement
that followed the April 2006 uprising has forced the Maoists
to take up a more politically pragmatic position than what
they had earlier promised to the marginalized caste and ethnic
activists. Three Madhesi factions – the armed Jwala Singh
and Goit groups as well as the Matrika Yadav group – have
already splintered off from the Maoist party over disputes that
the Maoists had reduced their commitment to the Madhesi
people. On the other hand, the indigenous nationalities in
the eastern and central hills are being more vocal about the
autonomous ethnic states the Maoists had earlier announced.
Very little has been said or done about how these competing
and conflicting demands for autonomy from various ethnic
and regional groups are to be accommodated. Even less has
been said about the economic and industrial implications of
such demands.

Consolidating the ethnicization of
class ideology into political and
market liberalism
Following the distinct waves of conquest, of trade, and
culture-nuanced business evolution in Nepal, it is only to
be expected that both markets and hierarchies would be
multidimensional. While cultural ideas deal with experiences
that far transcend both economic and political lives, there is
nonetheless a relationship between a plurality of cultures
and businesses, contrary to what the neoclassical economic
literature might lead one to believe. The economy would
not take the form it does were it not for the civil society
organizations that set the stage for the market, even though
the effects are complicated and counter-intuitive at times.
What the civil society organizations are today, on the other
hand are the complex makings of the historical negotiations
of the past.
Yet there has been virtually no research into the cultural
implications for economic activity or the fact that a business

structure is embedded within a plurality of orders. Nepali
policymakers and political scientists had been in denial of
cultural politics altogether until the Nepali Maoists opened
a Pandora’s box. Even though the study of the Maoist
movement has now taken centre stage, culture scholars
have hardly looked into the plurality of orders that are
influencing the Nepali market. Harriss-White (2005), whose
framework on the culture-economy nexus informs this paper
substantially, laments that this has received little attention
despite being so central to people’s lives and the politics of
the state. She points out that this may have to do with the fact
that one part of this question relates to formalist neoclassical
economics while the other part relates to anthropology – the
two disciplines that have rarely worked together.
The politics of the Nepali Maoists have in some way
forced both policymakers and politicians to acknowledge
the direct interlinkages between culture and economics on
the one hand and culture and politics on the other. In this
paper, I have articulated the key question that can no longer
be avoided after this acknowledgement: Why have issues of
ethnicity not faded away as a force in modern business and
politics? What is going to be different in the coming years as
Nepal embraces the former rebels into mainstream politics
and compels them to revise their basic ideological premises
in favor of political, economic and cultural pluralism?
The social order has proven to be anything but static. It
is the ongoing struggles within the traditional social order
(ethnic in case of Nepal) which has fed both politics and
business. Ethnic struggles have taken on new dimensions
through the uprising of the 1990 movement and the eruption
of the Maoist insurgency. The everyday ethnic order
continues to be underpinned by both tacit acceptance and
contestation of the hierarchy among multiple ethnic groups.
The outcome is a reconsolidation of the social order which
neither permits an authentic-false dichotomy nor a one-time
event but a ‘mimesis’ of the original order which undergoes a
continuous process of change.
Ethno-politics persisted and lately became exacerbated
out of the contradiction where the state allowed the
disproportionate representation of a few ethnic groups in
various state mechanisms but denied ethnic discontent in
policy discourses. Nepal’s ethnic movements have become
a way to resist this contradiction. With one ethnic group
ruling the country along with a few others allied with them,
cultural identities continue to inform the way businessmen
and citizens interpret and respond to the situations around
them. As long as communities embody caste and ethnic
identities, ethnic overtones will continue to inform the
production and exchange behavior of businessmen. Political
relationships between cultural groups vary from loyalty, to
alliance, rivalry, and attempts at domination. Consequently,
while the great bulk of state economic policy is framed in a
universalist language entirely indifferent to the local power
structures, its implementation is hardly ever indifferent to
such power struggles. Even when not asserting itself through
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positive or negative discrimination, policy will always etch
itself out differentially across population groups according to
the specific contexts, in this case cultural.
Cultural nuances of policies and politics crystallize better
in interactions between individuals as well as in the dealings
of business and labor associations. I have argued that during
the era of multi-party democracy, the role of the latter
has been minimal in catering to civic needs of their own
constituencies, and they have continued to function to fulfill
loyalties to the political rulers. Thanks to the disruptive
pressures businesses have undergone since the democratic
movement of 1990 and rise of the Maoist movement, some of
them have begun to use these associations for class actions.
Labor unions have begun to call strikes on labor issues such
as wages and job securities; business associations called
for collective negotiations with the Maoists to determine
appropriate ‘donations.’ As the Maoists strengthen their grip
both on state power and urban civic grassroots movements,
they are substantially restructuring the internal party
structure to cover as much grounds on these fronts. The
Maoists’ Janasewa Samitis, which were formed to perform
civic duties in urban areas, have now gained a new
prominence to almost stand at par with most of their older
organizational structures from the era of the People’s War.
This suggests that political competitions are no longer going
to be confined to parliament and street politics in Nepal
in the coming days, but the much neglected buffer zones
of business and workers’ associations—now influenced by
Maoist civic organizations—are likely to play stronger roles
in both articulating state politics and permeating it into
cultural and class associations.
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